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PERSPECTIVES OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN  




The financial crisis triggered the impression among European states that the negative 
effects of the further decreasing defence budgets could be tackled by tighter defence 
cooperation, especially on capability development. New initiatives have emerged both within 
NATO and the European Union in this regard, but interestingly, new parallel defence co-
operations have also been created and old ones have been revitalized on the sub-regional 
level. In Central Europe, two frameworks have recently evolved in this field: on the one hand, 
the Visegrad Countries (V4) – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – have 
been cooperating on various issues since the 1990s, though the first element of their defence 
cooperation was born only in 2011 by initiating a V4 EU Battlegroup. On the other hand, 
Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia have begun 
collaborating within the framework of the Central European Defence Initiative (CEDI) in the 
fields of training, operations and capability development since 2011. The article raises the 
question whether such regional forms could serve for incubating and nurturing new projects 
and giving timely answers to current capability shortfalls in Central Europe?1 
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International experts – as well as Hungarians – have been paying ever 
growing attention to multinational forms of defense cooperation2 and 
capabilities development since the financial crisis hit the defense sector in 
Central Europe with an austerity not seen since the end of the Cold War. The 
need for innovative ideas that tailor needs to deeds and provide deliverable 
options is great. However, most expert papers are limited to comparing strategic 
cultures, security identities or national security documents and focus less on the 
modus vivendi, on how multinational defense cooperation could be fostered and 
practical, delivering processes and methods of cooperation could be developed. 
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After the defense dimension of the Visegrad Cooperation was relatively 
fruitless for two decades, 2011-2012 brought V4 countries to a new level: the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia decided to establish a joint EU 
Battlegroup. Still there is a long way to go to make the V4 BG a reality, but 
there seems to be considerable space left for other capability development 
initiatives as well. Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and 
Slovenia have begun collaborating within the framework of the Central 
European Defence Initiative (in the fields of training, operations and capability 
development since 2011. The article raises the question whether such regional 
frameworks could serve for incubating and nurturing new projects and giving 
timely answers to current capability shortfalls in Central Europe?3 
 
1. Central European mutlinational frameworks of cooperation in the 
field of defence 
 
As mentioned above, we can differentiate between two multinational 
frameworks of defence cooperation in Central Europe, that of the Visegrad 
Countries (V4) and the Central European Defence Initiative (CEDI, previously 
also known as the Central European Roundtable on Defence Cooperation). 
International experts have been paying ever growing attention to these 
multinational forms of defence cooperation and military capability development 
since the financial crisis hit the defence sector in Central Europe with an 
austerity not seen since the end of the Cold War. (On the V4 see: Kiss, 2011; 
Weiss, 2012, Valasek and Suplata, 2012. On CEDI see: Csiki and Németh, 
2012, Kurowska and Németh, 2013) Recently comparative expert papers have 
also been prepared, aiming at pointing out the lessons learnt from existing 
defence cooperation frameworks and identifying the best suitable practices that 
might be able to further enhance and bring forward these collaborations. 
(Valasek and Suplata, 2012; Budai, 2013) The obvious reason for this renewed 
interest is the momentum that the Visegrad Cooperation and CEDI have been 
gathering since 2011. 
After the defence dimension of the Visegrad Cooperation was relatively 
fruitless for two decades, 2011-2012 brought V4 countries to a new level: the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia decided to establish a joint EU 
Battlegroup. Still there is a long way to go to make the V4 Battlegroup a reality, 
but it is a first step of pooling capabilities beyond doubt. CEDI, born as the 
Central European Roundtable on Defence Cooperation in 2011, has received 
less attention as this new framework for defence collaboration among Austria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia has been 
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viable models and methods of cooperation, wishing to give a comparative evaluation and formulate some 




functioning rather as an ‘incubator’ for new, practical initiatives that can be 
realized on the ground in the short term. The potential in CEDI, however, seems 
to be substantial, as several actual projects have successfully been carried on by 
participating states. 
It is obvious that these two frameworks differ significantly in terms of 
structure, institutionalization, membership and the way they function, and have 
triggered successful initiatives to a different degree. As we attribute the different 
dynamics behind the functioning of these defence collaborations to the different 
setup that characterize them, the following subchapters will briefly assess and 
compare them, highlighting those characteristics that are more capable to bring 
forward cooperation based on the experience gained and lessons learnt so far. 
 
1.1. V4 Defence Cooperation 
Cooperation among the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland in 
the framework of the Visegrad Group – or Visegrad Four (V4) – dates back to 
1991 when regional cooperation on Central Europe was pursued in order to 
mutually enhance the chances of Euro-Atlantic integration of these four (then 
three with Czechoslovakia being one federative state) countries. It was 
determining however, that the cooperation of the Visegrad Countries was based 
on a wide functional spectrum, including various fields of political, economic 
and cultural issues that all participants wished to cooperate upon by bringing 
their joint efforts closer along shared interests. Regional patterns of cooperation 
among these countries in defence-related matters have been shown only on a 
limited scale even after NATO and EU accessions (for example by harmonizing 
point of views and adopting joint declarations on defence and foreign policy), 
and despite their respective contributions to NATO collective defence and 
operations, as well as to EU CSDP, a characteristic ‘V4 defence project’ has not 
appeared on the horizon until 2011. 
Following two decades of fruitlessness in this field, the four countries 
agreed to establish a European Union Battlegroup in May 2011 – expected to 
become operational and be on standby in the first half of 2016. The role of the 
leading nation of the Visegrad Battlegroup is undertaken by Poland, also 
providing the majority of the troops (900), while the Czech Republic provides 
750, Hungary 510 and Slovakia 450 troops. Negotiations on force generation are 
under way as the V4 Ministers of Defence signed their Letter of Intent (LoI) at 
their meeting on March 6, 2013 on creating the Battlegroup and the Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoU) and Technical Agreements (TA) are under preparation 
to make practical cooperation possible. Having a modular structure, the leading 
roles for 7 out of 8 functional modules have already been divided among the 
participants. However, critical capability shortfalls are still on the table, combat 
and transport helicopters and strategic airlift among others that will need to be 
provided. (Tófalvi, 2013) Other issues, including the permanence of the 
Battlegroup as a sustained capability package among the V4 countries and the 
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possible application of the BG have also remained as topics for further 
negotiation. 
Moreover, the V4 Battlegroup gives an old answer to an old question 
dating back to 2004 by pooling such capabilities that might never be applied in 
practice as the European Union has proven to be unable to generate the 
necessary political commitment so far to use the much-appreciated Battlegroups 
even in times of need. Even if allow for the possible use of the V4 Battlegroup 
in a future EU crisis management operation, we must admit that the creation of 
lacking military capabilities should be the primary target of newly emerging 
initiatives of defence cooperation, going beyond putting together existing units 
into new force structures. The latter also bears significant value for providing 
capable, deployable multinational units that could not be provided on a national 
basis, but is less likely to fill capability shortfalls that could be covered only 
through deeper cooperation in the form of sharing capabilities (joint 
procurement and development). 
It is beyond doubt that the V4 Battlegroup has become the flagship project 
of the Visegrad Countries – and practically the only such project that has been 
born and nurtured as a V4 defence project. The reasons why cooperation in the 
field of defence among them has been limited as compared to other fields 
(energy policy being a successful example) in our opinion are the setup and 
characteristic of the cooperation, particularly meaning that: 
- V4 is a structured, institutionalized framework for cooperation, thus it is 
more rigid; 
- V4 constitutes of uneven partners regarding size, resources and 
capabilities (three small and a middle-size country, the latter exceeding 
the sum of the first three), thus it is likely to create dependencies and 
inequalities; 
- V4 projects are initiated based on the consensual participation of all four 
Visegrad countries, serving as a shared platform of initiatives, thus 
limiting the opportunity of spontaneously built collaborations by two or 
three partners. 
These characteristics limit the opportunities of cooperation to a certain 
extent, especially in the early period of incubating and nurturing newborn ideas 
when it would be especially important to ensure flexibility for finding suitable 
solutions. Since both policy makers and experts (see for example: Rasmussen, 
2012, Valasek and Suplata, 2012) agree that flexibility and adaptability are key 
enablers to successful co-operation, less rigid and regulated, and more tailored-
to-needs forms of cooperation should be given preference, as explained in the 
following. 
 
1.2. Central European Defence Initiative 
A brand new framework for defence cooperation among Austria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia begun in 2011, primarily 
called the Central European Roundtable on Defence Co-operation, more recently 
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named as Central European Defence Initiative. This framework includes the 
fields of training, operations and capability development and has achieved the 
following results by 2013: (Tófalvi, 2013) 
- Following upon the Czech initiative a multinational Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence battalion has been created 
involving the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia among the 
CEDI countries and extended to include Poland, also becoming the lead 
nation of the battalion, and becoming a successful Smart Defence 
program. Other countries have also expressed their interest in the 
formation. 
- Based on the ‘food for thought’ paper produced by Austria and Croatia, 
bilateral cooperation in the field of training Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) has become a practice by now and might be further extended to 
further CEDI countries offering joint training of SOF. 
- As the Multinational Logistic Co-ordination Centre (MLCC) was 
established in the Czech Republic in 2010, a regionally focused initiative 
on creating a multinational Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) is now 
on the table. MLCC has become a Smart Defence Tier 1 project since. 
- Hungary produced a ‘food for thought’ paper on Counter-Improvised 
Explosive Devices (C-IED) cooperation and in this framework ‘Train the 
Trainers’ and ‘Weapons Intelligence Team’ (WIT) activities have been 
successful in sharing lessons learnt. 
- The joint training of Czech, Croatian and Hungarian Air Mentor Teams 
for Afghanistan begun thanks to the negotiations going on within CEDI 
and has been successfully going on since, while also negotiations on 
deeper regional cooperation in aviation training are going on. 
Based on these projects, we can genuinely state that initiatives nurtured in 
the CEDI framework have proven to be successful, evolving both in terms of 
participants, attracting further countries to join, and in terms of integration into 
NATO Smart Defence programs. Thus, even though literature on CEDI is 
limited (Csiki and Németh, 2012), based on the experience gathered so far we 
can already outline the fundamental characteristics of this framework, such as: 
- CEDI is not structured and has remained un-institutionalized, thus 
providing more flexible options for negotiation (building on expert-level 
meetings and the formal meetings of Defence Policy Directors as well as 
the informal meetings of Ministers of Defence); 
- CEDI constitutes of relatively even partners regarding size, resources and 
capabilities (six small countries, none possessing disproportionately 
greater capabilities); 
- CEDI projects are initiated based on voluntary participation of any partner 
countries, being able to choose à la carte among defence cooperation 
initiatives without formal obligations. 
This means that the participants of CEDI build practical and more flexible 
forms of cooperation, starting with the spontaneous cooperation of 2-3 countries, 
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with CEDI playing the role of an open forum and clearing house for them. As 
experience has shown, there are cases when the ‘incubation’ period was so 
successful, that more countries also joined the initiative, developing them into 
broader regional as well as viable Smart Defence programs. Significantly, CEDI 
seems to be more fruitful and effective than Visegrad’s formalised cooperation. 
 
2. How Central European defence collaborations fit to the main 
European trends? 
 
We can draw further conclusions by comparing the two main frameworks 
of military cooperation in Central Europe – V4 and CEDI – to the current 
European trends. The creation of the Visegrad Battlegroup is a great 
achievement for the Central European region, if we compare what Central 
European regional initiatives have and have not achieved since the end of Cold 
War. Basically, the Central European countries could not establish a single 
viable, significant regional defence initiative. Probably, it is the reason why 
many analysts and practitioners raised their head for the particular news of the 
creation of the Visegrad Battlegroup, and not for other Battlegroups. 
At the same time, we have to recognize that the Visegrad Battlegroup tries 
to answer a demand which emerged ten years ago when the EU Battlegroup 
concept had been framed in 2004. That time many believed that these force 
packages will provide the answer for responding to smaller crises, but the 
usefulness and applicability of EU Battlegroups have been questioned, as they 
have never been used despite the fact that there was demand for it from the 
international community. (Major and Mölling, 2011, Hatzigeorgopoulos 2012) 
In addition, Tomáš Weiss highlights that the Visegrad Battlegroup ‘is not and 
cannot be the answer to the region’s difficulty in sustaining a reasonable level of 
military power’. Thus, ‘development of further common capabilities should 
follow, starting with training, schooling, and maintenance’ (Weiss, 2011). 
Accordingly, we can perceive the creation of the Visegrad Battlegroup as a late 
adaptation for a decade old demand of generating rapid reaction forces and 
capability development packages rather than fitting into the current trend of 
European defence collaborations, when everyone focuses on cost effectiveness 
and Pooling & Sharing of capabilities. 
Contrarily, CEDI provides a forum for six Central European countries, 
where they can raise potential areas of practical cooperation and each and every 
country is free to join and contribute to it. Thus, cooperation is forged on the 
ground of flexible and practical mechanisms while there is no ‘institutional’ 
pressure – as would have been the case in the Visegrad format, where the 
support of all participating countries are necessary to begin to cooperate on any 
issue. Last but not least, all participating countries in CEDI have about the same 
level of resources and military manpower, providing equal weight and influence, 
unlike the Visegrad Group, which includes Poland, which is often considered 
the ‘lead nation’. (Budai, 2013) 
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It is also important to note that CEDI has not just provided the ground for 
new raising initiatives, but in the cases of the Joint Logistics Support Group and 
the CBRN Battalion these initiatives had been extended to include all Visegrad 
countries (and even beyond), thus becoming a successful ‘incubator of ideas’ for 
the V4 cooperation as well, later on further channelled into NATO’s Smart 
Defence framework in which such ‘grass-root initiatives’ can complement large-
scale multinational capability development (e.g. procurement) programs. 
We can summarize the lessons learnt of the comparison and also highlight 
best practices if we also compare V4 and CEDI to NORDEFCO along those 
characteristics that have been discussed throughout the paper (the summary of 
the characteristics of NORDEFCO is provided partly based upon Bátora and 
Matlary, 2011): 
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Function PLATFORM FORUM AND CLEARING HOUSE 
FORUM AND 
CLEARING HOUSE 
Provides answers to: EARLIER NEEDS CURRENT NEEDS CURRENT NEEDS 
Table 1. A functional comparison of the Visegrad, CEDI and NORDEFCO frameworks 
 
However, CEDI and V4 cooperation should not be seen as competitive 
frameworks but collaborations which can complement each other. As capability 
shortfalls in the region are numerous, the division of labour between CEDI 
(taking the lead in relatively small-scale bi- or trilateral ‘start-up’ programs) and 
V4 (taking the lead in more ambitious, thus costly multinational programs) can 
provide a healthy environment for fulfilling different needs regarding military 
cooperation in Central Europe. As Kurowska and Németh (2012) have 
spectacularly depicted, if each nation can identify, choose and push forward a 
specific role (such as initiator, lead nation, facilitator, etc.) for itself within these 
frameworks and they are willing to underpin efforts with real political, 
professional (that of the military elite) and societal support, the current 
regionally focused frameworks could deliver capabilities both to the micro 
(nation state) and to the macro (NATO, EU) levels. However, the question still 
remains: how could we foster cooperation when simutaneously facing the 
challenges of financial austerity, strategic fatigue from current demanding 
military operations, a non-military security perception of Central European 
societies, sometimes limited societal trust towards each other, a returning 
interest in strengthening the nation state and the challenges of harmonizing 
procurement, development as well as pooling and sharing initiatives among 
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militaries of the region? In the following – instead of concluding an open-ended 
process – I will raise some recommendations for this purpose. 
 
3. Instead of conclusion: Recommendations 
 
Beyond the comparative analysis of existing cooperative frameworks in 
the field of defense provided above, a number of recommendations can be 
formulated – as assessed briefly upon the comments raised at the “Expert 
Workshop on Capability Development among the V4 Countries – ’How to tailor 
needs to deeds?’ –” organized on August 27, 2013 in Budapest: 
1) As the pillars of credibility required for enhanced multinational 
cooperation such as joint procurement are enduring political commitment 
and the stability in financial resources, these two shall be improved to the 
greatest extent possible within countries in the region. 
2) In order to improve political commitment that is firmly based on societal 
support, there is a need for a better communicated and channeled 
discourse – both political and societal discourse. Of course this cannot be 
complete without getting members of the military involved. A broader 
political and professional discussion, also more open to the public shall be 
initiated. 
3) Cooperation should be based on the widest possible pool of institutional 
partners in various levels. The idea of the Polish National Security 
Council should be replicated in other V4 countries, bringing together 
government representatives from all relevant fields. Cooperation among 
administrations should be extended and reinforced, including joint 
sessions of V4 parliamentarians, the regular and formal meetings of 
defense planners, etc. 
4) Direct cooperation among Ministries of Defense should especially be 
strengthened through the exchange of liaison personnel, military planners, 
procurement officers, etc. Such cooperation could follow the practices of 
the Franco-British defense cooperation by mutually establishing double-
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